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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to determine the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 on the earnings quality of public firms. I begin by discussing the history
of the act and examining its provisions. I then explain the significance of earnings
quality and how earnings quality can be measured. After gathering financial
statement and earnings quality data, I used SAS to compare quality of earnings
before and after 2002. From the results, I concluded that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 did in fact significantly improve earnings quality.
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Introduction
In the early 2000s, a series of financial scandals came to the attention of the
public. The most notable of these were the bankruptcies of Enron and WorldCom.
Executives contributed to the collapse of their companies by falsifying information
for personal gain or hiding the evidence if their company was struggling.
Accounting firms acted only in the interests of the companies they audited, profiting
from this relationship at the expense of shareholders (Holt, 2008). Investors had
little to no warning of these corporate bankruptcies and lost hundreds of billions of
dollars because of it. The public was outraged and investors began to lose confidence
in the market (Jahmani, 2008). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, also known as
SOX, was passed in order to combat this issue.
The goals of SOX included protecting and providing confidence to investors,
deterring and punishing fraudulent financial reporting practices, and improving the
ethical standards and internal controls of companies (Holt, 2008). SOX was also
intended to make financial statements more transparent and understandable and to
promote accountability by senior executives. One result of SOX, if the act was
effective, would be improved earnings quality of public firms. Earnings quality is a
function of both the financial performance of a company and how its accounting
system measures performance. It is an important aspect to consider because it
affects whether or not companies' reported earnings are informative about their
financial performance (Dechow, 2010).
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In order to determine the effect SOX had on earnings quality, I gathered
financial statement and earnings quality data for a set of publicly traded
companies. After synthesizing and analyzing this data, I was able to determine
what measures of earnings quality changed significantly after SOX was passed.
From the results of my research, I concluded that SOX had a positive impact on
earnings quality.
Background
I. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
Successfully monitoring internal controls and enforcing ethical accounting
problems had been an issue for decades prior to SOX. The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act of 1977 (FCPA) monitored internal controls and accounting practices; this law
applied to all companies filing with the SEC. Unfortunately, FCPA was not
successful in curbing fraud, as evidenced by the continued financial scandals and
unanticipated bankruptcies. The scandals of Enron, WorldCom, and other
companies spurred the creation of SOX by showing the need for legislative reform.
While FCPA addressed the bribery of foreign officials and accounting transparency,
SOX targeted domestic fraud directly. SOX improved on FCPA by imposing
additional disclosure requirements about a company's internal controls and
financial reporting practices, as well as placing further criminal penalties on
fraudulent disclosure (Ge & McVay, 2005).
SOX is widely considered to be the most significant piece of financial
legislation since the 1930s regulation of securities markets (Holt, 2008). By bringing
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governmental oversight into the accounting industry, the act aimed to expose
corruption, reduce financial statement fraud, and restore public confidence in the
market. While some companies saw compliance with the new law as costly, SOX
generally required companies to do things they should have already been doing.
Other companies believed that SOX compliance could actually help them, if utilized
as a management tool (U.S. House, 2004).
SOX is divided into 11 chapters, each with a different focus. While I will
touch on all of them, sections 4, 8, 9, and 11 are particularly significant. These
chapters specifically were intended to impact companies in ways that would
improve earnings quality. When examining the impact of SOX on earnings quality,
it is the success of the rules set forth in these chapters that are in question.
The first chapter, denoted as Title I, established the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). PCAOB became responsible for developing
professional standards of auditing and ethics, overseeing the audit process of public
companies, and enforcing compliance with SOX and other regulations. Title II
mandates that accounting firms cannot simultaneously provide both audit and nonaudit services to a company. The purpose of this is to maintain independence
between auditors and the companies for which they prepare reports. Title III
outlines the responsibilities of public company audit committees. It also states that
chief executive officers and chief financial officers may have to forfeit certain
bonuses if their company is found noncompliant with financial reporting
requirements due to misconduct.
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The motivation behind Title IV is to improve the accuracy of financial
disclosures. It states that all financial reports must follow generally accepted
accounting principles. It also prohibits firms from maintaining or extending credit
to give personal loans to any director or executive officer. Rules pertaining to codes
of ethics are included in this chapter as well. Each firm is obligated to disclose
whether or not it has a code of ethics for its senior financial officers and explain why
if it does not. Section 404 presented a distinct challenge for firms to comply with. It
requires that each annual report contain an internal control report. The report must
state that management is responsible for establishing internal control structure and
procedures for financial reporting; it must also assess the effectiveness of the
internal control structure and procedures as of the end of the most recent fiscal
year. Title V discusses the conflicts of interest that can arise when analysts are
recommending equity securities. The rules in this chapter are meant to give
investors more confidence in the objectivity of research reports.
The authority and resources of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) are discussed in Title VI. The SEC has the authority to censure or deny any
person from appearing or practicing before it, but the person must first be given
notice and an opportunity for a hearing. The Commission can also prohibit any
person from participating in an offering of penny stock if court proceedings
determined misconduct. Any person may be barred or suspended from association
with a broker or dealer or from engaging in the business of securities, insurance, or
banking; this action would be taken after fraudulent, manipulative, or deceptive
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conduct is found. This chapter also appropriated funds for the functions and duties
of the SEC, including security enhancements, additional professional support, and
information technology. Title VII discusses studies to be conducted by the
Comptroller General and the related reports that should be generated. Studies
mentioned include an examination of consolidations of public accounting firms and
an analysis of the role of credit rating agencies in the function of securities markets.
Criminal fraud accountability is the focus of Title VIII. It first describes the
criminal penalties for altering, falsifying, or destroying corporate records. The next
topic covered is securities fraud. Any debts incurred in connection with violation of
Federal securities laws will be nondischargeable, as will any debt incurred through
common law fraud in connection with the sale or purchase of a security. The statute
of limitations on securities fraud is 2 years after the discovery of the violation or 5
years after the violation itself. Title VIII also directed the United States Sentencing
Commission to review and amend the sentencing guidelines for fraud and
obstruction of justice. The consequences should be sufficient to deter and punish
these activities. Whistleblowers are given protection under this chapter. No
company can threaten, suspend, demote, or discharge an employee for assisting
with an investigation or providing information about violations of SEC regulations.
Any person who is discharged under these circumstances can file a complaint with
the Secretary of Labor and may receive compensation for damages.
Title IX increases the penalties for white-collar crime. Conspiracy or attempt
to commit any of the criminal fraud offenses mentioned is subject to the same
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penalties as commission of the act itself. Offenses included are mail fraud, wire
fraud, and violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. It
states that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines should be reviewed to more
effectively deter and punish fraud. Guidelines should also account for any
additional circumstances that might justify exceptions to a sentencing range. A
written statement by the issuing company’s chief executive officer or chief financial
officer must accompany all reports containing financial statements. This statement
must certify that the report accurately presents the financial condition of the
company and fully complies with all requirements. This is complemented by Title X,
which simply states that a company’s federal income tax return should be signed by
the chief executive officer of the firm.
The next and final section of SOX is Title XI, which deals with corporate
fraud accountability. Anyone found obstructing or influencing an official proceeding
will be subject to a fine and up to 20 years imprisonment. This includes concealing,
altering, or destroying records with the purpose of impairing the document's use in
an official proceeding. Title XI also asserts that the SEC can prohibit any person
form serving as an officer or director for violating regulations or other conduct unfit
for an officer or director. It also amended section 32 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, increasing the criminal penalties (H.R. 3763).
Implementing SOX was initially costly for companies; the most expensive
aspect was installing and maintaining an Internal Control System. There was also
a significant jump in auditing fees. There were theories that United States capital
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markets would become somewhat uncompetitive after SOX. In the beginning, many
foreign companies delisted from U.S. exchanges, and more U.S. corporations listed
overseas to avoid compliance costs. However, soon other countries adopted their
own versions of SOX, and regulations began to converge internationally.
Corporations also realized the benefits of improving internal controls. Some of these
positive effects include increased operating efficiency, increased investor liquidity,
decreased employee theft, and reduced likelihood of employee redundancy (Holt,
2008).
II. Quality of Earnings
Earnings quality is defined as the likelihood that a firm can sustain current
earnings in the future (Beneish, 2002). Having high quality of earnings is important
to reducing uncertainty in the market and improving capital market efficiency. It
reveals the current financial state of firms while providing accurate inputs for
predictions about the future (Ewert, 2011). Quality of earnings is complex to
determine because it is not directly observable. Various models have been developed
to measure earnings quality, using variables that are directly observable as a proxy.
One such model is the Beneish M-Score Model, which uses financial ratios to detect
earnings manipulation.
Analysis
I. Data
In order to determine whether or not SOX improved earnings quality, I
analyzed two sets of data. From the Compustat database, I used Fundamentals
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Annual data from 1995 to 2004. This contained balance sheet, income statement,
and cash flow statement data from all of the companies in the Compustat database.
I also used earnings quality data on publicly traded companies from 1981 to 2014.
This contained 63 variables, including Beneish Model variables: Days’ Sales in
Receivables (DSRI), Gross Margin Index (GMI), Asset Quality Index (AQI), Sales
Growth Index (SGI), Depreciation Index (DEPI), Sales, General, and Administrative
Expenses Index (SGAI), Leverage Index (LVGI), Total Accruals to Total Assets
Index (TATA), Beneish Model Quality Score (M-Score). These variables were used to
determine the quality of earnings. The definition and significance of each of these
variables can be found in Table 1.
II. Methodology
Using SAS, I combined the Compustat Fundamentals Annual data and
earnings quality data. I then created a dummy variable in the combined data set to
differentiate between company data from before SOX was passed, and data from
after SOX. This dummy variable took on the value of zero if the observation
occurred before 2002 and a value of one if the observation occurred after 2002. Data
from 2002 itself was not included to control for activity occurring directly before and
after the act was passed that may not be representative of overall trends. After
performing a t-test on the nine Beneish Model variables, I was able to determine if
earnings quality significantly changed after SOX was implemented.
Each of the variables found to be significant were then tested further in SAS
with regression analysis. In this model, I included 4 new variables to control for
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firm-level differences: firm size, market-to-book, earnings yield, and leverage. The
definition and significance of each of these variables can be found in Table 2. From
these results, I was able to conclude specifically in what ways SOX affected
earnings quality, as well as infer why these changes may have occurred. For
variables with a negative relationship to earnings quality, a significant decrease
after 2002 supports the hypothesis that earnings quality improved after SOX. For
variables with a positive relationship, a significant increase after 2002 supports the
hypothesis that earnings quality improved after SOX.
Results
The t-test compared the average of each variable before 2002 with the
respective average after 2002. The t value was created by subtracting the post-SOX
value from the pre-SOX value then dividing by the standard error. A positive t
value indicates a decrease in the variable after SOX, while a negative t value
indicates an increase in the variable after SOX. The t value was used to determine
if a change was statistically significant. The following data was collected:
DSRI

GMI

AQI

SGI

DEPI

SGAI

LVGI

TATA

MScore
-0.8715

Mean
1.5221 5.7985 -1.7669 4.0055 1.1442 1.3167 2.3249 -0.4749
Before
SOX
Mean
1.4312 2.3642 -1.2779 2.0882 1.0960 1.1779 1.2379 0.0075
-0.6024
After
SOX
t Value
0.85
0.99
-0.62
4.35
2.32
2.43
1.82
-2.50
-0.14
There was not a significant difference in Days' Sales in Receivables Index (DSRI) after SOX.
There was not a significant difference in Gross Margin Index (GMI) after SOX.
There was not a significant difference in Asset Quality Index (AQI) after SOX.
There was a significant difference in Sales Growth Index (SGI) after SOX.
There was a significant difference in Depreciation Index (DEPI) after SOX.
There was a significant difference in Sales, General, and Administrative Expenses Index (SGAI)
after SOX.
There was not a significant difference in Leverage Index (LVGI) after SOX.

13

There was a significant difference in Total Accruals to Total Assets Index (TATA) after SOX.
There was not a significant difference in Beneish Model Quality Score (M-Score) after SOX.

I then used SAS to regress SGI, DEPI, SGAI, and TATA on the dummy
variable and the control variables. The outcome was as follows:
SGI
DEPI
SGAI
TATA
t Value
-2.37
-1.11
-1.65
1.43
There was a significant difference in Sales Growth Index (SGI) after SOX.
There was a not significant difference in Depreciation Index (DEPI) after SOX.
There was a significant difference in Sales, General, and Administrative Expenses Index (SGAI)
after SOX.
There was a not significant difference in Total Accruals to Total Assets Index (TATA) after SOX.

Discussion and Inferences
DEPI decreased after SOX was passed, but this difference was only
significant under the t-test. DEPI compares a firm’s depreciation expense and
property, plant, and equipment to those of the previous year. This represents the
rate at which assets are being depreciated. A higher DEPI indicates that a firm may
be overstating the useful lives of its property, plant, and equipment. This would in
turn cause income to be overstated. The decrease observed in DEPI is a positive
signal. It means that property, plant, and equipment is being depreciated at a more
accurate rate thus income is more accurately reported. It is likely that the internal
control provisions in SOX contributed to this decrease despite the fact that the
change was not statistically significant under regression.
TATA increased after SOX was passed, and this change was also only
significant under the t-test. TATA represents a ratio of a firm’s total accruals to
total assets. This ratio should be fairly consistent unless there are major changes
occurring within the firm. Accruals are conventionally a commonly altered figure in
fraudulent disclosures. Therefore, there is a correlation between high accruals and
14

financial statement manipulation. A high TATA could indicate that a firm is
overstating profit by relying on uncollected revenue. The fact that TATA increased
after 2002 shows that SOX was not effective in improving this aspect of earnings
quality. This may be due to the fact that it is more difficult to detect fraud
perpetrated in this manner, and there is no provision in SOX specifically addressing
the appropriate use of accruals.
From the results of the regression, I concluded that the passage of SOX
contributed to a statistically significant decrease in both SGI and SGAI. SGI
represents the growth rate of sales as compared to the previous year. Growing firms
are more likely to commit fraud because of the pressure to sustain the appearance
of high growth even if growth has slowed. However, it is important to note that the
presence of high growth rates does not itself indicate fraudulent activity. The
decrease in SGI shows that after 2002, there were lower growth rates reported.
While this could mean that there was less growth in sales after 2002, it more likely
means that there were less falsely inflated growth figures published due to the
passage of SOX. The increased criminal penalties for committing fraud suppressed
firms’ desires to keep up with shareholder expectations even if this meant
sacrificing the accuracy of financial disclosures. The decrease in SGI shows that
SOX was effective in decreasing fraudulent reporting, thus improving earnings
quality.
SGAI measures how the ratio of a firm’s sales, general, and administrative
expenses to sales compares to this ratio in the previous year. Increases in sales are
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generally proportionate to increases in expenses. If sales are increasing faster than
expenses, this could indicate that revenues are overstated. This would be conveyed
by a high SGAI. The decrease in SGAI after 2002 means that sales became more
proportionate to sales, general, and administrative expenses. Revenues became less
overstated or more correctly stated due to the provisions in SOX concerning internal
controls. This shows that SOX was effective in increasing the accuracy of financial
statements, thus improving earnings quality.
Conclusion
After the series of financial scandals exposed in the 1990s and early 2000s,
the public could no longer rely on a firm’s financial statements to capture its true
economic condition. The passage of SOX in 2002 brought hope for a future with less
fraudulent activity and restored investor confidence. SOX was not the first law in
the United States to monitor internal controls and accounting practices, but it
brought momentous change to public companies. Its impact extended even further
when some non-public firms voluntarily adopted provisions of SOX, and other
countries around the world were inspired to create their own version of the act.
One main objective of SOX was to improve the accuracy of financial
disclosures, improving earnings quality. The ability of a firm to have high quality of
earnings is arguably more important than the creation of high earnings itself.
Without an accounting system that accurately measures performance, earnings are
neither controllable nor sustainable. The intentions of SOX were promising, but
enacting new regulations would have been pointless if the law was not effective.

16

After identifying variables that reflect earnings quality, I was able to
examine those variables pre- and post-SOX in order to determine the act's
effectiveness. From nine measures of earnings quality, a t-test found a significant
change in four of the variables after SOX was passed: SGI, DEPI, SGAI, and TATA.
Regression analysis controlling for firm differences determined a significance in
only two variables: SGI and SGAI. The decreases in SGI and SGAI that occurred
after SOX support the hypothesis that the act was effective at improving the quality
of earnings in public companies. Based on the meaning of these variables, the
provisions of SOX that improved the accuracy of financial disclosures were likely
the increased criminal penalties for falsifying corporate records and the push for
effective internal controls.
Analyzing public companies a few years after SOX was enacted would not
have provided an accurate look at the law's effectiveness. This is especially true
since it took some companies a few years to comply. Now over a decade has passed,
and the provisions of SOX are well assimilated into the practices of public
companies. Understanding how and why SOX was effective, and in what aspects it
was ineffective, has lasting implications. This exposes parts of SOX that could be
strengthened and new issues that should be covered in future regulatory laws. This
knowledge will help lawmakers to maintain the progress that SOX has already
made in improving earnings quality and bring further improvement in years to
come.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Beneish Model Variables
Variable Definition
DSRI

Significance
Disproportionate
increases in this
ratio suggests that
earnings are
overstated

GMI

Firms with falling
gross margins have
poor prospects and
thus are more likely
to manipulate
earnings
If greater than 1,
indicates potential
increase in cost
deferral

AQI

SGI

Growth firms have
greater incentives to
manipulate earnings
If greater than 1,
indicates possibility
of upward revision of
assets useful lives to
increase reported
earnings
Disproportionate
increase in sales is
negative signal about
future, thus firm
more likely to
manipulate earnings
Debt covenants are
an incentive to
manipulate earnings

DEPI

SGAI

LVGI
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TATA

M-Score

-4.84 + (0.92*DSRI) + (0.528*GMI) + (0.404*AQI)
+ (0.892*SGI) + (0.115*DEPI) - (0.172*SGAI) +
(4.679*TATA) - (0.327*LVGI)

Accruals measures
the extent to which
managers make
discretionary
accounting choices to
alter earnings
An M-Score greater
than -2.22 is an
indication of
financial statement
manipulation

Note: All variables are indicators of earnings manipulation. Any change in
the above variables signaling an increase in earnings manipulation was
interpreted as also indicating a decrease in earnings quality.
Table 2: Control Variables
Variable
Firm Size

Definition

Significance
Negative
relationship
between size
and earnings
quality
Firms with high
market-to-book
ratios tend to
earn
subsequently
lower returns
Firms with low
P/E ratios tend
to outperform
firms with high
P/E ratios
Controls for
differences in
financial risk

Market-toBook Ratio

Earnings
Yield

Leverage
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Figure 1: SAS Model
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